Polish relief as the Duck Brothers are clobbered by Donald
Poland has not yet perished
So long as we live.
What foreign violence has taken from us,
We will reclaim, sword in hand.
Poland’s history of suffering at the hands of Germany and Russia is so long that its anthem was written at a time when the country had, once again, been partitioned off the map. Despite the loss of statehood, the anthem expresses the hope that, against the odds, “Poland has not yet perished / so long as we live…”
Over the last two years Poland has, once again, suffered immensely. But this time the suffering wasn’t imposed by powerful invaders from the West or East.
No, President Lech Kaczynski and Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski – known, after their looks and surname, as the Duck Brothers – had hijacked Poland via the polls by evoking the worst in its citizens: an hysterical anti-Communist witchhunt which combined McCarthyism with partisan political manipulation; complex-laden, passive-aggressive nationalism which fused racism, anti-Semitism and a paranoid emnity to Germany; an amateurish foreign policy which left key embassies without embassadors; populist opposition to the EU; and economic mismanagement: Jaroslaw Kaczynski didn’t think it a problem that close to half of Poles don’t have bank accounts – indeed, he doesn’t have a bank account himself, preferring to entrust his Prime Ministerial income to his mother.
This time round, Poland’s spooky spectacle was self-imposed.
But at last Sunday’s election, recalling her anthem’s fighting spirit, a different Poland arose to reclaim, pen and polling paper in hand, what domestic violence had taken from her… The result: a resounding defeat of the governing coalition and a victory for the pro-European Civic Platform, led by a calm, intellectual Donald Tusk.
Though the Civic Platform, like the Kaczynkskis’ Law and Justice party, is considered right-of-center on the European political spectrum, its policies are likely to be radically different. As the designated Prime Minister, Tusk is hoping to substitute the traditionalist and protectionist populism of the Kaczynksi years by a modernizing approach: he will push for free-market reforms at the same time as taking a more liberal stance on social issues.
Internationally, the first priority of the new Polish government will be to return Poland to the center of Europe. Under Tusk’s leadership, the Sejm, Poland’s parliament, will move quickly to ratify the EU’s constitutional treaty, which the Duck Brothers had long opposed. This should be welcome news to all Europeans (even though Gordon Brown, who is in his own quandary about how to convince the British to accept the EU treaty, will be unhappy to have the spotlight turn on him…)
Relationships with Germany – which had detiorated to a level of mutual hostility unknown since before Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik reconciled the traditional enemies in the 1970s – will improve markedly, even though real disagreements remain. Poland is worried about a German-Russian oil pipeline which is being built outside Polish territory. It is also angry at the plans, championed by descendents of Poland’s German minority, to commemorate their forefathers’ expulsion after World War II without direct reference to the preceding Nazi terror.
The Polish-German relationship will not turn peachy overnight. But Tusk will know how to raise these issues calmly, as disagreements between friends should be. As a result, Tusk might convince Angela Merkel to take Poland’s genuine worries more seriously than she had when they were raised as a phony part of Kaczynski’s frenzied rhetoric.
The greatest measure of tact, however, will be required in Tusk’s handling of the Polish-American relationship. Tusk and his pro-business party are by no means anti-American – nevertheless, Tusk’s campaign promise to bring back home the remaining 900 Polish soldiers in Iraq will strain Poland’s relationship with the Bush administration. As the “Coalition of the Willing” is further decimated – most of the countries which invaded Iraq at America’s side now make up the “Coalition of Countries whose Previous Governments were Willing” – Donald Tusk will strive hard to assert Poland’s role as an equal partner, neither a vassal nor an enemy, to the US.
Overall, the better Poland has good reasons to be relieved that the Duck Brothers got clobbered by Donald. So has the rest of the world.
For more coverage on Poland’s elections and European politics, see also Yascha Mounk’s blog, A European View.
Putin – Democracy’s Man in Moscow
It’s been a long while since good news for democracy has come out of Russia. Last week, however, brought two interesting developments. First, Garry Kasparov – a charismatic and popular former chess champion – decided to stand as the opposition candidate in the upcoming Presidential elections. Then, Vladimir Putin – Russia’s cold and stern, yet eerily even more popular President – implied that he may seek to become Prime Minister when he has to step down from his current post.
In my view, only one of these decisions has real potential to be good for civic freedoms in Russia. Which? Counterintuitively, it is Putin’s self-serving political calculation, not Kasparov’s well-meaning idealism, which gives me hope.
Don’t get me wrong. Obviously, I’d prefer to see Kasparov, rather than Putin, at the helm of the Russian state. Hailing from two unpopular minorities – his mother is Azerbaijani and his father Jewish – Kasparov understands the need to contain Russia’s resurgent nationalism and xenophobia. With roots in the Soviet dissident movement and an extensive appreciation of what is good in Western liberal democracy, he is also one of a dwindling group of Russian intellectuals firmly committed to political pluralism.
But at the Presidential elections, despite his personal popularity in chess-crazed Russia, he does not have the slightest chance of making significant inroads (if, indeed he will be allowed to stand at all). With the Russian economy profiting from skyrocketing oil and gas prices, and the media under the Kremlin’s firm control, Kasparov’s candidature will hardly be noticed. Its only effect is likely to be counterproductive: by giving the impression that political opposition is possible in Russia, it will serve as a figleaf for Putin’s authoritarianism.
Putin, unlike Kasparov, has no desire for democracy. Yet, it is his strategy which gives me hope.
Until now, there seemed only two options. Either Putin would get his unthinking allies in the Duma, Russia’s lacklustre parliament, to rubberstamp constitutional changes which would allow him to serve a third Presidential term. This would be catastrophic, for even the carefully maintained semblance of legality, which by the force even of its hallow rhetoric has so far guaranteed at least some observance of due process, would thereby be given up.
Or he would seek to get an uncharismatic ally elected as President, in the hope that he would continue to serve the economic interests of Putin and his ex-KGB buddies. This latter strategy has considerable risks for Putin – let’s not forget that he himself was made President as Yeltsin’s uncharismatic puppet, a strategy which failed abysmally. But it does not hold any corresponding opportunities for democratisation. For even if a power struggle among Putin and his successor ensued, it would be based outside of legitimate political institutions and the public arena. Democracy will not return to Russia through a showdown between an oligarch who used to be President and a self-serving President who wants to become an oligarch.
The situation would be different, however, if Putin was to stay in politics as Prime Minister. If – and this remains a big if – his puppet-President, after initial hesitation, was to develop some independence of mind (or interest), parliamentary democracy might be restored. For Putin, in his role as Prime Minister, would now have a vested interest in strengthening parliament and, given his popularity, might succeed in doing so.
Basically, even if Putin remains the strong man of Russian politics, there is justified hope that a change in his role would necessitate changing Russia’s overall institutional structure. This would shift some power away from the Presidency – which, at the moment, is the seat of unrivalled and uncontrollable authority.
The freak outcome might be the development of a mixed Presidential / Prime Ministerial system, perhaps not unlike the French model, in which centres of power would, for the first time in Russian history, be genuinely split.
Don’t bait your breath, however – this scenario, I admit, is extremely unlikely. Yet, it is not unprecedented that a clash of the worst of self-serving interests should, unexpectedly, bring about the best of changes. With Putin as Prime Minister, a clash of interests might reinvigorate democratic competition, not back-room dealing between oligarchs. It’s not much of a hope, but it may just be the best we’ve got.