Samantha Fang is an associate editor for Perspectives.
Short-Term Gains, Long-Term Costs
In light of the precarious situation in Iraq, the US military has begun forging partnerships with local Sunni tribes, arming those who promise to fight against al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia with ammunition and money. Given the mixed composition of the Iraqi insurgency (a motley of Ba’ath Party loyalists, al-Qaeda foreigners, Sunni Iraqi nationalists, and Shiite militia), this new risky strategy seeks to separate and antagonize moderate nationalists and foreign Islamists. Many Sunni tribesmen, former insurgents who say they are now disillusioned by Islamist militant extremist tactics, have recruited thousands of followers to fight with coalition forces against al-Qaeda and have alerted the US military to roadside bombs and other booby traps. Already in al-Anbar, the most dangerous province in Iraq, violence has plummeted by half from 356 coalition deaths last year to 116 this year. With such results, the US military now plans to arm other Sunni groups in the Diyala and Salah Al-Din Governorates. However, despite clear short-term gains, the US cannot continue such bilateral agreements with local Sunni militias. Bypassing the fledgling Iraqi government in Baghdad and arming one of Iraq’s many competing factions, the US military will help in the collapse of the coalition government and intensify sectarian violence in Iraq: a strategic blunder in the long-run.
First, US support of local Sunni groups undermines the authority of the predominately Shiite Iraqi government, weakening its already questionable legitimacy and efficacy. In a June 16th interview with Newsweek, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki opposed the arming of Sunni groups, claiming that many could be “connected with terror” and may “turn into a militia.” He also stated that decisions to support local sheikhs were the prerogative of the Iraqi government alone. Despite the Bush administration’s public support of Maliki, this military step is essentially a vote of no confidence. In sidestepping the Maliki administration, the US not only intervenes on Iraqi sovereignty but also sends a tacit message that Iraqi government troops are incapable of preserving order. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the US risks further alienating the Shiite government at a time when Congress is demanding political milestones of progress.
Washington has consistently stressed that the main impediment to security in Iraq has been the existence of illegally armed militias and stated that only Iraqi government forces should be allowed to carry weapons. However, arming Sunni tribes loyal to individual sheikhs amounts to creating militias and endowing renegade groups with licenses of violence. Such action undercuts US and Iraqi government efforts to disband the militant followers of the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose Shiite militias form a large constituency of the anti-American insurgency. Experts who foresee Iraq’s descent into ethno-sectarian turmoil believe that the US’s targeted arming of Sunnis will heighten the bloodshed of such a future civil war.
There are also fears that the US military may be arming the enemy. As with the British and the Turks, tribal sheikhs in western Iraq are playing political games with the US military to achieve their own personal ends. Of one such sheikh, a local al-Qaeda fighter told TIME Magazine, “He wants money and power, and will shake the hand of anybody he thinks can get him money and power. But tomorrow, he can turn and cut off the same hand if somebody else offers him more.” It is certainly risky strategy giving support to local Sunnis who have attacked US forces in the past. With no US loyalties and definitely no loyalty to the Iraqi government, the tribes now cooperate with the US because of a shared discomfort with foreign al-Qaeda operatives. US plans are therefore “an act of desperation” (following New York Times’ John F. Burns) in which the enemy of an enemy has become a friend. These are certainly not ties that bind and therefore cannot be relied on. Furthermore, if a legitimate Iraqi central government can be established, it is unlikely that these tribes will yield the power—and the arms—that the US military has given them.
Indeed, arming local sheikhs has little to no efficacy in the long run if the US military attempts to shape a lasting, peaceful Iraqi central government. Though the current tactic may prove fruitful from a military point of view, it has debilitating political consequences. Undermining the current Iraqi administration of Maliki, favoring one side of a probable conflict, and cultivating self-enemies are risky steps in a process that many consider already doomed. If any hope is to remain, the US government should focus its efforts on bolstering Iraqi government forces and cultivating a shared Iraqi nationalistic identity that transcends sectarian lines.
Turkey’s Extreme Secularism
Recent demonstrations in Turkey—such as the one today in Samsun, where thousands of flag-waving citizens flooded the city’s central square—have affirmed the country’s commitment to secularism. Protests began in early April against exiting president Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s attempt to nominate Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as the presidential candidate. There is overriding public concern, especially among women and the upper middle class, that the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party with Islamist roots, will use the July 22nd presidential and legislative elections to broaden its scope and push religion into the public sphere. At risk is the balance of power between secularists and Islamists in Turkey, threatening the legitimacy of the AKP’s one-party rule. The protests could lead to a broadening of the political base to mitigate populist demands, but there is fear that a coalition government would become more nationalist and less stable.
Turkey has been cited as an example of the compatibility of Islam and democracy, with Indonesia as another salient example. The AKP government, under Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, has led the country through five years of stable one-party government, economic growth, and lowered inflation, as well as attracted foreign investment and began talks with the European Union about membership. However, news that Gul—a conservative whose wife wears a headscarf—was named a possible successor to Sezer whipped the public into frenzy. The pure symbolism of the veil brings into question just how secure Turkey’s identity is as a secular state, with its extreme separation of church and state.
In response to the protests, Gul has removed his name from consideration, and the AKP is trying to project itself as a moderate group. It has recently declared its intention to name women and entrepreneurs as candidates in Turkey’s July 22nd elections. However, despite the AKP’s declarations of secularism, parties such as the secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) have been gaining steady support. The July 22nd elections could mark a major change in the demographic of Turkey’s Parliament, in which the AKP now holds 363 of 550 seats. The outcome of the demonstrations and the July elections will prove a interesting example of how a moderate Islamist party can sustain itself—or not—in a secular democracy.