The Carrot and the Stick: Drug Eradication in Afghanistan
When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, it was in the hope that regime change and reform could eliminate terrorism in the country. Improving the quality of life in Afghanistan was a side-benefit, and the US government was sure that toppling the Taliban could only make things better. Five years later, however, Afghanistan is still riddled with problems, chief among them drug cultivation and trade; US and UN efforts at stemming drug production have not yet achieved success. A new strategy is needed to put Afghanistan back on track.
The Taliban, the United States, and the United Nations have all tried to squelch opium farming in Afghanistan, but opium production reached an all-time high in 2006, marking the failure of all three organizations to have a substantial impact. Afghanistan provides over ninety percent of the world’s opium supply. The UN Office of Drugs and Crime estimated that the opium trade composes over fifty percent of Afghanistan’s GDP in 2005—roughly $3 billion. Herein lies the problem: Afghani farmers rely on opium cultivation to put food on the table. Efforts to eradicate opium pose a direct threat to their livelihoods, and thus the stability of the country as a whole. On the other hand, opium production adversely affects the world population. For example, opium is often smuggled through Iran, where opium addiction is estimated to be the highest per capita in the world. Drug use has become a huge contributor to the spread of HIV and AIDS in Iran today.
Since the invasion in 2001, the US, UN, and new Afghani government have relied primarily on direct means to eradicate opium. Tractors roll over fields of opium-producing poppies, effectively destroying the whole crop. Thanks to corruption, however, these methods have only destroyed a fraction of Afghani production. In response to the failures of the US and UN to stem the drug trade in Afghanistan, critics are calling for drastic change in policy. The Senlis council, an international think-tank, rebuked: “Eradication dramatically exacerbates poverty and has caused a wave of starvation across southern Afghanistan.” Senlis advocates the institution of poverty alleviation programs to free Afghans of dependence on opium for survival, rather than direct decimation of farmers’ crops.
Ultimately, only a combination of both strategies has a real shot at success. Programs targeting poverty already exist, but more money must be appropriated to this cause. Unfortunately, ensuring that this money reaches farmers and is spent appropriately is a difficult task; government accountability and transparency are less than stellar. Even if funds were properly spent, farmers would need another incentive to switch from opium cultivation: the threat of crop eradication. Without this threat, it will always be in the farmers’ interest to produce opium since it sells for a higher price than other produce. But given the risk that their crops may be destroyed, farmers are most likely to switch to other products, so long as they can do so and earn enough to survive. The two programs together—crop eradication and poverty alleviation—have the potential to seriously impact the drug market in Afghanistan.