Michael Jaskiw is co-Editor in Chief of the Harvard International Review.
Speaking Up at Columbia
Today, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad delivered his much anticipated address at Columbia University. Though the speech received a frenzy of media coverage, a dispassionate analysis of Ahmadinejad’s reasons for speaking in the first place was lost in a swirl of questions regarding free speech, denial of the Holocaust, Iranian involvement in Iraq, and the role of speakers at college campuses. Putting these issues aside, it becomes easier to see the event (and its reception) as an excellent opportunity for Ahmadinejad to build up his arsenal of rhetoric and propaganda.
The Iranian president managed to capture America in a catch-22, made possible only by our county’s commitment to free speech and free press. Had Ahmadinejad been denied the opportunity to speak on his trip (or had his event been cancelled), he would have returned to Iran with (at least in his eyes) a concrete instance of American hypocrisy. Once in front of a more friendly audience, he could have alleged that American values of free speech and free discussion were as empty as the US’s commitment to peace in the Middle East. This of course requires blurring the line between the policies of Columbia University and the US government, but conflating the two poses little problem when crafting a narrative of American duplicity.
But, having been allowed to speak, he also made some strategic gains. The hostilite reaction to his presence can be repackaged in Iran as indicative of general American hostility to Iranian interests. This is not a critique of those who chose to protest against his views. Rather, the point is that the images of the protest–(justifiably) angry groups of American citizens, signs with X’s through Ahmadinejad’s face–can be retransmitted as American bigotry and antipathy towards Iran and the rest of the Muslim world. Even the remarks of Columbia’s president Lee Bollinger, labeling Ahmadinejad a “petty and cruel dictator” can be touted as unfair insults levelled at a visiting head of state.
But both of the above points obscure the fact that on some level, Ahmadinejad is trying to play on the West’s terms. Anne Applebaum at Slate.com explains: “Ahmadinejad’s agenda is different, though, from that of the traditional autocrat…Thus, the speech at Columbia: Here he is, the allegedly undemocratic Ahmadinejad, taking questions from students! At an American university! Look who’s the real democrat now!”
The content of his speech was not terribly surprising or substantive–he danced around most questions with broad and cryptic responses. More important than the content, however, was the act itself. He has put the ball in America’s court. He has, at least on face, come to the US with good intentions–asking to pay respect at Ground Zero, and engaging in discussion. In the face of often brutal criticism, he was generally calm and polite. He made sure to share his views in an academic forum, adding an air of scholarly rigor and integrity to his views on topics ranging from the Holocaust to treatment of homosexuals. He made an explicit request for American students to come to Iran for a similar exchange. He was firm, but not bombastic or apocalyptic. In short, he used the forum and the media coverage surrounding it to subvert the image–created by those very same media sources–of himself as a dangerous and irrational despot.
A Chilly Climate
This week, a Moscow court issued a warrant for the arrest of oil tycoon and billionaire Mikhal Gutseriyev. Charges against him surfaced after he resisted pressure to sell his company, Russneft, to the state–he explains in a memo to his employees: “”I was invited to leave the oil business ‘on good terms.’ I refused. Then to make me more compliant, the company was subjected to unprecedented hounding.” The hounding has now taken the form of charges of tax evasion and illegal business practices.
Though the details of Gutseriyev’s case are unique, this same saga–a Russian tycoon that contravenes the will of state and finds himself facing prison or exile–has been playing on repeat during the last few years in Russia. Gutseriyev, who has fled the country and is now in hiding, has learned a lesson from the last few re-runs. Fellow tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky was once one of the richest men in the world–after refusing to give up control of his company, Yukos, and supporting opposition candidates, he now finds himself locked up in an Siberian prison.
The situation is more complicated that it seems on face. The irony is that the charges against Gutseriyev, Khodorkovsky, and others have some merit. Corruption, fraud, and a lack of transparency are endemic to Russian oil companies and perhaps Russian big business in general. The disconcerting matter is that the law is used selectively only against those who defy the will of the state. Clamping down against corruption is a admirable goal–but in an environment where few are free from fault, charges of corruption and tax evasion have instead become instruments of political control.
These developments are obviously not positive for rule of law in Russia. Gutseriyev’s son died a mysterious death two days before charges were leveled against his father. Russian prosecutors are hot on Gutseriyev’s own trail, as he is rumored to have been in Turkey and England recently. The use of extreme and brutal tactics against Gutseriyev and his family are intended to send a message to other business owners who would try to maintain their independence. Though tragic, these implications are all too clear.
Perhaps the more interesting question is what this means for oil and Russia’s future. All things considered, Gutseriyev was a relatively small fish–he ran into trouble when he tried to buy more oil and expand his holdings without state permission. The Russian government’s reaction belies its keen interest to monopolize the oil industry. But squabbling has erupted over who gets the spoils of Gutseriyev’s arrest. Consultant Mikhail Krutikhin explains, “Before, there was a precarious balance, but now it’s a complete mess in the Kremlin…Putin seems to be a lame duck, and factions seem to be breaking away and acting on their own.”
Because the workings of the Russian government and its state-owned industries are rather opaque, it is difficult to gage whether this squabbling is a spat between acquisitive oligarchs or a sign of serious instability. But because the stakes are so high–losers risk their assets, their lives, and the safety of their families–the former may soon develop into the latter. As the reality of a Kremlin-owned oil monopoly approaches, Europe must also be wary of the consequences. Because it is highly dependent on Russian energy, Europe seems to be consistently losing leverage against Russian demands and prices.
The final question is one of economic theory. What does this climate–where allegiance to the state is the first rule of successful business–mean for the long term health of the Russian economy? Making money off of oil and gas, at least on face, depends more on control of land and infrastructure than on creativity, innovation, and competition. But if the Soviet experiment with state-run companies has any predictive value, then Russia may be destabilizing the base upon which it has built its recent social progress and economic growth.
Santa has Company
Last week, a Russian team planted a titanium capsule with a Russian flag under the ice caps of the North Pole. This mission was touted as scientific, but its primary purposes seem to be political and propagandistic. The ostensible goal is to establish a Russian claim to the Artic region. According to a 1982 provision of the Law of the Sea, a nation can make a claim to artic territory if it can prove that the territory is connected to its own continental shelf. While the legal issues surrounding such claims are nebulous, two larger lessons can be drawn about modern Russia.
First, Russia is increasingly styling itself as an energy state. Russia has little interest in ice and frigid waters. It does, however, have an interest in a potentially vast energy supply: up to 25 percent of the world’s remaining untapped oil and gas sources may lie under the Artic Ocean. Though the mission may do little to advance Russia’s claim to the Artic, it does show that Russia is actively (or at least more actively than other states) pursuing these new energy supplies. Gas and oil are coming to dominate the Russian economy and also guide Russian foreign policy. Russia is usually categorized as a post-Soviet state and as such it is generally compared to and grouped with countries of the former USSR. Perhaps this theoretical perspective needs revision–a comparison with oil-rich states in the Middle East could be fruitful as well.
Second, Russia is pursuing an increasingly nationalistic and aggressive foreign policy. The “Artica-2007″ mission was largely a political stunt–it was backed by president Putin and led by Artur Chilingarov, a deputy speaker in Russia’s parliament and famous artic explorer. The rhetoric surrounding the event is worth analyzing. Chilingarov remarked, “The Arctic always was Russian, and it will remain Russian…and I don’t give a damn what some foreign individuals think about that.” He will need his thick skin: the mission has drawn ridicule from most western nations. The deliberate act of flag-planting as claim to territory befits a 16th century conquistador, not a modern state engaged in a complex web of international law and regulations. But Russian authorities are no doubt well aware of this–they decided, however, to rekindle the fires of Russia’s imperial past. This incident should not be dismissed as an instance of mere bravado or as a cry for attention. It seems to fit well into a recent pattern of contrarian and confrontational foreign policy.
Russia has refused to back down and extradite a suspect in Alexander Litvinenko’s death, thus escalating tensions with Britain. Russia has used hostile language in its opposition to plans for US missile defense systems in Europe. With its claim to the Artic, Russia has irked Canada, which also maintains a keen interest in the region. All of these actions are justified as some sort of self-defense against a world order that is trying to control Russia and deny its rightful status as a great power. Russian political analyst Vyacheslav Nikonov brushed aside criticism of the mission as “nothing but the latest attempt to put Russia in its place.” The submarine mission can thus be understood as an instance of Russia asserting itself. The troubling question is whether Russia’s future acts of self aggrandizement will be as harmless as a tiny titanium flag locked miles below the polar ice cap.
Satanic Reverses: Back and Forth on Salman Rushdie
Salman Rushdie’s knighting by the Queen of England has sparked protests across the Muslim world, most notably in Iran, Pakistan, and Malaysia. His recent knighthood–and the uproar surrounding it–may seem to be the result of a simple dichotomy; a respect for free expression and literary achievement in Britain (and more broadly, the West) pitted against intolerance of religious dissent in Iran (and other Muslim nations). But this opposition is deceptively simple. It represents merely a snapshot of Rushdie’s story–one in which, as has become routine for him, he is caught in the crossfire of international forces far larger than himself.
Rushdie’s tale is one of constant oscillation. Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah first issued a fatwa against Rushdie in 1989. This order was rescinded in 1998 after Iranian negotiations with Britain, only to be put back into effect soon after by other Iranian clerics. When the fiasco surrounding the Satanic Verses erupted, he was also demonized by many right-leaning British officials. A member of Margaret Thatcher’s government commented that “[Rushdie's] public life has been a record of despicable acts of betrayal of his upbringing, religion, adopted home and nationality.” Now, he enjoys the support of many British Conservatives, who see his knighthood as a symbolic push back against Islamic fundamentalism. He has gone in and out of hiding. The curious comments of Pakistan’s religious affairs minister–which all but justified a suicide attack against Rushdie–may once again take him out of the public eye.
The only constant in this sea of change is that Rushdie is rarely taken for what he is: an author. He has been painted as an apostate, an infidel, a cultural hero, and an attention seeker. He is now a pawn in the most recent struggle between Britain and its allies and Iran. A speaker in the Iranian parliament explained, “The latest act of the British government was shameless and imprudent and can not be interpreted to anything but blind hostility and absolute brainlessness.” Perhaps the greatest travesty is that an event intended to honor Rushdie’s literary achievements has been swept up by the prevailing currents in international politics.
Disillusion and Dissolution
This Monday, President Viktor Yushchenko finally followed through with his threat to dissolve Ukraine’s Vekhovna Rada (Parliament). The beleaguered president accused the ruling coalition—led by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukhovich—of violating both constitutional and democratic principles by encouraging representatives to defect from their original parties to join the ruling coalition.
From the perspective of democratic legitimacy, Yushchenko’s argument makes sense. In last year’s parliamentary elections, Ukrainian citizens voted for party lists, not individual candidates. If candidates can join a new political party (often for dubious reasons) after being elected, then voters seem to ultimately lose control over the legislative process—their votes may have allowed the election of a candidate who no longer represents their interests. Yushchenko has argued that new elections allow voters to reassert their preferences in light of this fact.
From a strictly legal perspective, Yushchenko’s call for early elections is not as strong. The Ukrainian Constitution enumerates the conditions under which parliament may be dissolved. These conditions were intended to allow the president to dissolve parliament in the case of extreme and intractable gridlock that made a ruling coalition impossible. However, a majority coalition currently exists and has been active in passing legislation for months.
The current political crisis involves a dizzying array of constitutional and legal complications that involve the minutia of Ukrainian law and political practice. But all of these legal technicalities do not have to be untangled for a few important inferences to be made.
The ruling coalition under Prime Minister Yanukhovich has already passed resolutions ordering the president to rescind his decree on the grounds that it is unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court—notoriously inert—is setting a date to decide whether the call for new elections is legal or not. Regardless of how the Court rules, a showdown between the president (and his opposition coalition) and the prime minister (and his majority coalition) is inevitable.
Both sides have already brought thousands of protestors to Kyiv, the capital city, home to the peaceful Orange Revolution protests of 2004. But many indicators suggest that this crisis will not be resolved in the same neat and peaceful manner.
Protestors are now increasingly radical and disenchanted with the democratic process. Both Yushchenko and Yanukhovich’s camps have control over divisions of Ukraine’s security forces, which will likely be present in response to the increasing number of protestors. Both sides understand the stakes of the current political crisis. For Yushchenko, the dissolution of parliament is a desperate attempt to re-assert his power as president and to energize the opposition. For Yanukhovich, new elections could mean the loss of absolute parliamentary control he has so carefully built up. The impending conflict between these two forces will threaten the stability of democratic practices and the viability of the Ukrainian government itself.
Back in the USSR?
It appears that the Beatles aren’t the only ones with Georgia on their minds. The country just released four Russian soldiers who had been arrested and held on spying charges. The release was made as a gesture of goodwill, in hopes that escalating tensions with Russia would ease.
Russia, however, refuses to drop the issue and has gone on the offensive. It has imposed economic sanctions on Georgia and has cut all lines of transportation to the former Soviet republic, though the Russian officers which originally sparked the conflict have safely returned home. This hostile response comes in the face of protests from the EU and President Bush.
Spying–an art ex-KGB officer Vladimir Putin may himself have some experience in–is not the real issue here. Rather, it is about the audacity of a country like Georgia to raise its hand (however small) against Russia. “One must not feed off Russia and insult it. The Georgian leadership must understand this,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted. ” Russian parliament speaker Sergei Mironov justified the retaliation on the grounds that “‘We won’t forgive those who spit at us.”
Unfortunately for Georgians, Russia is willing to back up this angry rhetoric with action. But thus far, Russia’s reaction–like that of a parent who can only address a child’s growing unruliness with ever sterner punishments– has been so extreme and asymmetrical that it seems to mask a deeper fear of losing its influence on Georgia. Georgian restaurants and nightclubs have been raided in Moscow, and Georgian workers in Russia (more than 300,000 of them) can no longer wire their earnings back home.
When Vladimir Putin was prompted on his nation’s response, he wryly remarked: ”These people think that under the roof of their foreign sponsors they can feel comfortable and secure. Is it really so?” On paper, Russia no longer controls the former Soviet republics, which have their own governments, elections, and autonomy. Is it really so?
Shattering the Allure of Authoritarianism
Many questions still remain after General Sondhi Boonyaratkalin’s non-violent coup in Thailand last week. When will new elections take place? What will become of the assets of politicians suspected of corruption? Will curfews, censorship, and restrictions of civil rights be lifted as promised?
The next few weeks will provide at least partial answers to these questions. But one often overlooked advantage that the (for the time being) authoritarian and militaristic regime seems to have over its predecessor is the ability to stem the violent conflict with Muslims in Thailand’s southern provinces.
Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra adopted hard line tactics towards insurgents in Southern Thailand which only led to an intensification of violence. A Muslim representative from the region noted, “The ouster of Thaksin should make the situation in the South better…We should now see a change in policy.” Ending this violence is certainly a high priority–the conflict has claimed 1700 lives in the last two years.
But Thailand is not the only example of an authoritarian regime that seems to be better at controlling violence than its democratic counterpart. In Somalia, the Union of Islamic courts has brought order to the once volatile capital city of Mogadishu, and is expanding its power across the country. This expansion leaves the official government virtually powerless.
This is not meant to be a defense of dictatorial regimes. Somalia’s Islamic courts have gained popularity because of their ability to establish relative domestic security, but have the country careening towards another war with Ethiopia. Likewise, it is yet to be seen whether the regime change in Thailand will in fact quell violence and whether devolution of power back to the public will in fact occur. But in many developing countries, especially those with long-standing violent conflicts, establishing peace seems preferable to universal suffrage.
The trade-offs between authoritarianism and democracy (decisive action versus policies that reflect at least some element of public opinion) are part of the age-old debate about the elusive ideal form of government. But perhaps more energy should be devoted to crafting new democratic regimes that anticipate the advantages of their dictatorial alternatives. This way, fewer countries will be susceptible to authoritarianism in the first place, likely making their domestic and international politics better for all in the long term.
A New Kind of Victim
Supporters of the War on Terror have never advocated that their mission would not come without cost–the logic, rather, is that the costs of the ongoing conflict are acceptable sacrifices for the gains made in terms of personal safety for American (and other) citizens.
While questioning both aspects of this trade off–the acceptability of the means and the reality of the promised benefits–is certainly popular, it has been easier to paint the picture that the results have been less than stellar. After all, we are subject to a constant barrage of violent images and stories about the victims of continued terrorism, whether in Iraq, Turkey, or elsewhere. Though certainly real, the stories of those detained, questioned, or even tortured in the name of making progress against terrorists groups are less palpable. Generally, their names, identities, and plights remain confidential. The (perhaps circular) explanation for this is that the release of such sensitive information jeopardizes the success of the fight against terrorism.
Hopefully, the story of Maher Arar will do something to change that. On September 26th, 2002, Arar–a Canadian software engineer–was detained by US officials in New York who (allegedly) acted on information from the Canadian government. Soon after, he was whisked away to Syria where he was imprisoned and tortured for nearly 10 months. Finally, this week, a report from the Canadian government has exonerated Arar of any terrorist activity and condemned the actions taken by Canadian and US authorities.
This case raises countless concerns about the methods used in the ongoing War on Terror. First, and most obviously, the US has the bad habit of getting around torture bans by outsourcing the task to other nations (in this case, Syria). Second, the practice of cooperating with other nations to apprehend terror suspects tends to obscure accountability for mistakes. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper has declined to apologize to Arar or take action against the Canadian officials involved on the grounds that his government was not in power at the time of the rendition. The Bush administration has not responded to the case yet, but it is doubtful that their answer will amount to the apology Arar is seeking.
The sentiment that animates the continued struggle against terrorism is largely fueled by images and memories of those who suffered and died from terrorist attacks. It remains to be seen how many cases similar to Arar’s it will take to temper this emotion with the realization that real people have been sacrificed in the name of the War on Terror as well. The goal is not giving up against Al Qaeda or any other enemy, but rather to reform the protocols for persecuting terrorism so that such blunders do not occur again.
Mixed Signals
This week, Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich was in Brussels, promoting his country’s entrance into the EU. However, on this same trip, he announced that Ukraine would be indefinitely delaying its application for membership in NATO. This sort of dichotomy makes some sense on paper. The EU is a primarily economic organization, while NATO is one for defense. Perhaps Ukrainian markets are ready to be integrated into Europe, while the country’s military is not fully prepared to cooperate with NATO members.
This explanation is convenient, but also likely inaccurate. Despite Yanukovich’s posturing, the EU has made public the fact that it will not admit Ukraine anytime soon. Increased economic interaction is certainly a possibility, but full-fledged membership is at most an aspiration. NATO membership has grown unpopular in Ukraine, especially in the eastern and southern regions of the country where Yanukovich has his political base. This attitude of mistrust of NATO, a Soviet-era holdover, is sustained if not encouraged by Yanukovich’s Party of Regions.
The more likely explanation is that Yanukovich is paying lip service to the idea of integration with Europe and the West. Where the prospects for success are slim (EU membership), he advocates changes that are unlikely to occur. This phenomenon is not something unique to Ukraine’s EU push or even Ukraine itself. Many post-Soviet countries have made cosmetic changes to their image (Belarus, for instance, is technically a democracy though in practice a dictatorship) while making little actual progress since 1991 . Ukraine, after 15 years of independence, is still having problems with corruption, the establishment of an independent judiciary, and commitment to fair constitutional reform.
The EU seems reluctant–and perhaps understandably so–to take a chance on Ukraine, hoping to see the country make more progress first. Paradoxically, EU membership may be the very thing necessary to make this sort of initial progress possible. It is certainly in the interest of the EU to have stable and transparent governments in Eastern Europe. However, it will take more than hollow promises and wishful thinking to make this a reality.
Bye Bye Blair
This week, Tony Blair announced that he would be leaving office and relinquishing his post as Britain’s Prime Minister sometime within the next year. The climate in which Blair made his announcement was less than calm; Blair was for all practical purposes forced to make it by his own Labour Party members.
The newsworthy fact is not that Blair will eventually resign, per se–the more interesting element of this story is that Blair is under intense pressure to do so as soon as possible and to set a date for his departure. Though Blair refused to set such a date, he did (quite tactfully) acknowledge his disappointment with the Labour Party, remarking “I would have preferred to do this my own way.”
The first, and most obvious impact of the Labour Party’s turn against one of its own will be on the legacy of Tony Blair. Arguably the greatest leader in the party’s history, he will undoubtedly find his last months in office rather sour if not humiliating. Though interesting, it is a difficult and imprecise task to divine how history will remember Tony Blair.
The major policy impact will come when Blair hands over power to the Labour Party’s finance minister, Gordon Brown. Blair finds himself in his current predicament because of his close ties with President Bush and his decision to involve British forces in the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In part, he is being used as a political martyr; he is being cast off to restore the image of the Labour Party. In part, he is also being held up as a lesson to the rest of British politicians. The lesson seems to be that following the US’s lead too closely is (politically) dangerous.
This is not to say that British-US relations will take a significant turn for the worse. But, a drift away from the United States, especially on foreign policy issues, is likely to begin. This distancing may be symbolic–part of Blair’s problem was the perception (perhaps unfair, but nonetheless popular) that he was Bush’s lapdog. Much like Blair’s legacy, the exact direction and nature of this drift will be hard to divine before it happens.