Noam Lerer is a former Senior Editor of the World In Review section of the Harvard International Review. He currently resides in Cambridge, MA.
A Test for the UN
While the focus on the Middle East is on Iran, and its conspicuously ignored deadline, a little tension could be spared to Lebanon, where the credibility of the United Nations is very much on the line. Following very heavy pressure for an international ceasefire, the Security Council passed on, in an effort spearheaded by France. The effort nearly turned into an embarrassmentfrom the beginning when France pledged 200 troops, instead of the expected 2,000, making the new peacekeeping force look like a farce. Luckily, international pressure, a large commitment by Italy and, if one feels charitable, clarified rules of engagement, changed that.
If the new UNIFIL is to avoid being the failure that the first one was, the UN, and the nations participating in the force, are going to have to show a serious commitment and willingness to take risks. For better or worse, the stability of this region in the middle east depends on it.
The ceasefire is already quite tenuous. Hezbollah, in blatant violation of the ceasefire, has repeatedly announced that it will not disarm. Both Lebanon and the current head of UNIFIL have announced they will not do the job for them. Syria’s announcement that it will refuse to have UN troops on its border, and Lebanon’s apparent acquiescence to it, certainly does not bode well for hopes that weapons smuggling, at least, will stop. Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora has reversed hints that his nation might be ready for a peace treaty and announced that Lebanon will be the last nation to sign one with Israel. While Nasrallah has announced that he intends no second round of the war, the tone of Hezbollah’s envoy in Iran was substantially more threatening.
Meanwhile, Kofi Annan, in his trip to the Middle East, has condemned in unequivocal terms Israel’s continuing blockade of Lebanon. While he paid lip service to the fact that Hezbollah has not yet released its Israeli prisoners (another violation of the Security Council’s ceasefire) he has not brought up the rather touchy point that the UN has no intention of enforcing what may be the most critical part of the resolution- the disarmament of Hezbollah. While ending the Israeli blockade would certainly signal a decrease in hostility, Annan, and the UN, have shown little, if any sign, that UNIFIL is prepared to ensure this mission will more aggressively preserve the peace than the last one.
With a Hezbollah intent on regrouping, a painfully slow UNIFIL deployment (5,000 troops by Friday, 2 weeks after the passing of the ceasefire, is not good) and an extremely suspicious Israeli public, southern Lebanon remains a tinderbox.
This is a chance for France, the EU as a whole, and a whole panoply of UN supporters to prove that its peacekeeping can succeed in an extremely hostile environment. Their credibility is on the line, and will suffer a huge blow if they fail. UNIFIL can either be a peacekeeping force or impotent observers relegated to human shields for Hezbollah, as they were in the war that just ended. For the sake of the Middle East, I hope they will be the former.
Mexico
While all eyes are focused on the Middle East and the state of Lebanon’s fledgling democracy, Mexico continues its month plus of uncertainty following Calderon’s narrow (contingent) election victory. The final results will not be known until Mexico’s Election Tribunal makes a decision until about a month, and a partial recount of approximately 9% of Mexico’s polling stations has been ordered in the meantime, a number dwarfing the demands unsuccessfully made by Al Gore.
But Obrador, the PRD candidate, is having none of it. Contending that the election was stolen from him, he has been continuing massive demonstrations that have practically made Mexico City grind to a halt, alleging massive fraud and demanding a hand recount of every vote cast, a nearly impossible bill.
Many of his accusations have failed to hold water, and his allegations that some local PRD observers who saw no foul play at their station must have been bribed seems rather wild eyed. That he is suspicious is understandable: Mexico has had a long history of electoral fraud in the past, complete with a mysterious computer crash that led to the direction of Carlos Salinas. No one, including Calderon himself, would want to see a Mexican president dogged with questions of his legitimacy for the rest of his term. Nevertheless, Mexico’s safeguards this year were robust to say the least, and observers have certified a clean election. It is at least possible that Obrador is mistaken in his allegations.
These sorts of issues are precisely what Mexico’s stringent election laws and clean judicial system are supposed to look into. The decision of a special election court to have the partial recount is a sign that Mexico’s institutions are working and attempting to determine as impartially as possible who the election’s winner is.
The worrying sign is that Obrador appears determined to secure his outcome at whatever cost. Nothing, it seems, will satisfy him other than a decision that he in fact, won the election. In his crusade to win the election, he is attacking the election authorities, the judicial system and nearly every institution tasked to create a fair, orderly, system in Mexico. Obrador is showing a marked distrust of the nation he hopes to lead in the near future. His current actions seemed bent a coercing the state’s organs into ruling his way, something which has its uses in an autocracy, but not in a fledgling democracy trying to strengthen the legitimacy of its institutions. This begs the question, what is more distressing: a President whose legitimacy is weakened because of fraud allegations (albeit allegations rejected by the judicial system) or a President who seems to have won his position by force?
Obrador’s strategies do him no good, and they certainly do not help Mexico.
Israeli Elections
On March 28, three weeks from now, Israel will hold its first elections since the incapacitation of Ariel Sharon. After Sharon’s second stroke, many analysts predicted that his successor, whoever he would be, would not be able to stand in the shoes of this larger-than-life character. Others thought that simply choosing a leader would be a hard enough feat. Kadima, supposedly a party built by the will of one man and held together strictly by the ambitions of its varied members, was going to fall apart. Once the spike (to 44 seats) caused by Israeli sympathy subsided, the tough questions would remain.
But Kadima held together. A new leader, Ehud Olmert, was chosen, with no competition. Shimon Peres was convinced not to jump ship, and the party continued. Then the critics wondered how Ehud Olmert would perform. Olmert, unlike Sharon, it was wagered, would not be able to have such ambiguity about his future plans and simply say to the people “trust me.” He would have to unveil a real policy, one open to criticism, which might erode his support. And this famously blunt man, who could never be a father figure like Sharon, would not be able to build the same consensus.
But a funny thing happened. Olmert did lay out a platform, a clear one. He has made it clear that the West Bank will get its funding slashed in the next Knesset and that its position is precarious. In a move barely, if at all, reported by the Western media, he did something Sharon never dared to do: evacuated illegal outposts in the West Bank. The move hit closer to home for the settler movement than the evacuation of Gaza, and there was violence. But he persevered.
Since Sharon’s stroke, corruption scandals have plagued Kadima, enveloping a cabinet minister as well as Sharon’s son. Hamas swept to power in the Palestinian Authority, a move that should have drastically increased support for the right and hurt Kadima. Despite all of this, Kadima is still at 37 seats, nearly double that of Labor, its nearest rival; it is almost certain that it will win the election.
What is happening here? And why are trends in Israel so strikingly different from the PA?
It would seem that a new consensus has emerged in Israel, one far more durable than was previously imagined, and, among English-speaking publications, noted only by the Israeli Jerusalem Post. This consensus appears to be that Israel cannot stay in the Palestinian territories, but also that there is no partner to be trusted. The solution has been to disengage from the territories while continuing to take the precautions suitable to the low-scale war that has not yet ended. Israeli unilateralism is not, then, simple a knee-jerk or desperate reaction, but carefully considerd: withdraw from the territories (barring some territory as a bargaining chip), build a fence, and let the PA run itself and prove to the world that it is not yet a responsible government.
This, in my opinion, explains why the election of Hamas has not hurt Kadima. The current status quo is good for Israel: for every day the leaders of the PA refuse to curb terrorism, refuse to recognize Israel, and refuse to impose order on the land they already rule, Israel seems more and more like the responsible side, waiting for a partner capable of achieving peace.
While the PA stews in its own juices, the Israeli economy has gotten out of its recession. While chaos and violence tear the PA proto-state apart, the separation barrier has substantially lowered incidents of terrorism in Israel. While the Palestinians refuse to confront the extremists in their midst (or even elect them), Israel continues to confront its own extremists and exclude them from political consensus.
More important than the fact that the current arrangement has staying power is the fact that it has allowed Israel, for the first time in more than a decade, to focus on itself at least as much as on the Palestinian conflict. Amir Peretz, the Labor leader, has shifted much of the focus of Israeli politics to economics. None of this would have been possible had disengagement not created an atmosphere in which the fate of Palestine became almost wholly the responsibility of the Palestinians.
I believe that Kadima will continue to maintain its lead and form the next coalition after the elections. I also believe that, for all the current fear of a legitimized Hamas continuing a crusade to destroy Israel, that Israel is nevertheless in a better long-term position. Israel is in a position to withdraw to secure borders, turn itself inward, and wait. It is now up to the PA to determine whether it can build a viable state, one capable of achieving prosperity and achieving peace.