Eric Lee is the Managing Editor of the Harvard International Review.
Iraq: What’s Next?
With General David Petraeus set to deliver a September update and Congress needing to reauthorize defense spending for fiscal year 2008, the Iraq debate will only get more complicated and intense.
There already exist half a dozen proposals in Congress to deal with Iraq. One plan toys with troop readiness requirements to limit the surge. Another mandates an end date for pull out, while some Democrats plan to unveil a new plan that sets a clear beginning date for redeployment but leaves it up to president to decide when to complete the withdrawal.
Americans, who supported the invasion of Iraq by large numbers, have now turned decisively against it. A majority of Americans now trust congressional Democrats more than Bush on the war, and even more stunning, the Washington Post reports that by 2 to 1, Americans say “Congress, rather than the president, should make the final decision about when to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq.”
But lost in the details of which phased redeployment plan is better is what our long-term responsibility in Iraq should be. We need to redeploy our troops in a manner that assists, rather than fails to clarify, our long-term goals.
Even as leading Democratic candidates for president have pledged that they will end the war, many are less willing to mention that they intend to lead a “residual force” behind in Iraq. In other words, American troops will remain in Iraq even after redeployment is completed. These politicians argue that such a force is needed to train Iraqi troops, mediate severe fighting between Iraqi factions, and fight al-Qaeda terrorists in Iraq.
But if those are the goals of the residual force, would a smaller number of troops be able to accomplish these goals? In fact, as noted in the Financial Times, would our continued efforts to train Iraqi forces actually worsen the situation since we’ll be arming Iraqi factions while they fail to achieve a political solution that can provide the stability? If the worst does happen in Iraq and civil war escalates, are we willing to commit the US troops necessary to prevent genocide? If not, why are some US politicians willing to commit troops to end genocide in Darfur?
The Republicans are worse on this issue. They continue to pledge they are “in it to win it,” yet the Bush administration has engaged in a risky strategy of trusting former enemies of ours to fight our other enemies. The surge may or may not stabilize the country, but even that will only be temporary. Permanent peace will require diplomacy and a political solution by the Iraqi themselves. The push to escalate the war also fails to see that redeployment can be a means to change the political calculus in Iraq and that even a set timeline can send a message the United States intends to end the mission on our terms and conditions.
The status quo isn’t working. Our military is stretched thin, and our country has lost focus on other foreign policy threats, such as the belligerence of Russia, the rise of China, and the regrouping of other al-Qaeda networks in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Our national leaders need to reassess realistically our strategic interests in Iraq and decide what our commitment to Iraq is.
Are we there to prevent regional instability? Or are we there to prevent genocide?
Are we there to end the civil war? Keep Iraq from being a safe haven for new al-Qaeda terrorists? Protect the Iraqi civilians?
Defeat only certain factions of Iraqis? Keep the Iranians at bay?
Each of these questions require a different strategy, different tactics, and different troop levels.
So let’s not forget the big picture here: spelling out what our commitment in Iraq is before we wrangle over the details. Five years after the invasion, the American people deserve an honest answer as to why we’re still there and how we intend to make the current situation better.
Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd
Over the weekend, Taiwan broke off diplomatic relations with Chad, and immediately after, China and Chad happily announced that they had resumed relations.
For China, it was another victory in its continuing effort to isolate Taiwan and a reflection of China’s growing interest and influence in Africa.
For Taiwan, now left with only twenty-four countries that recognize Taipei instead of Beijing, it was stinging rejection that underscores how little sway the tiny island now holds. Taiwan’s “checkbook diplomacy,” giving away millions of aid in exchange for recognition, is no longer working when China can match and even raise.
For Chad, it was necessary decision based on interests and needs. China needs oil, and Chad has oil. Chad desperately wants China to stop aiding rebel forces that have been seeking to overthrow the current government. Chad also hopes China will use its influence with Sudan and in the UN to stabilize the crisis in Darfur in neighboring Sudan as Chad has been forced to deal with fleeing refugees.
For other nations, it should be wake-up call, if they haven’t realized already, that China is aggressively moving into Africa, skillfully using diplomacy to simultaneously woo and coerce nations that are dependent on financial assistance but that have largely been ignored by Western powers.
Chad’s switch will bring about several potential implications. First, while China thus far is winning over new “allies” across the world, but it must follow through with its promises. Countries will expect China to deliver, and it will be interesting how China will defuse situations in which two of allies are at odds with each other (like Chad and Sudan) as its reach grows.
Second, the move by China to embrace Chad does technically upset the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, which China, Taiwan, and the United States have all pledged not to disturb for the time being. China needs to be careful when playing this game; the more Taiwan feels pressured and cornered by China, the more likely the ruling, pro-independence party in Taiwan will make more noises toward breaking off permanently.
Ultimately, while stealing one of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies may be fun and symbolic in reasserting that Taiwan is a part of China, China needs to consider if humiliating Taiwan is worth destabilizing the Taiwan Strait.
After all, China can still pressure countries like Chad with its economic clout and military power without the imprimatur of an official relationship. None of Taiwan’s allies can do much for Taiwan, so why not continue to let Taiwan spend millions on relationships that yield the island nothing in return?
Or there is another audience China is playing to as it tries to demonstrate its clout among nonaligned nations?
For Free Trade, a Bad Case of the Mondays
Early this Monday morning, word trickled out of Geneva: no deal.
The Doha Round of negotiations on free trade had collapsed. The New York Times reported that it appears unlikely that an agreement will occur in the final two years of the Bush Administration.
While not as big of a story as the ongoing conflict in Lebanon, the failure of the talks was undoubtedly a blow for all involved. And like most multilateral arrangements, there will be finger-pointing all around.
The failure also demonstrated the numerous political dimensions of a topic not usually considered to be sexy at all: agriculture. The farm lobbies in the United States and Europe are very effective at lobbying their respective governments. It certainly doesn’t help that the first primary in US presidential races is in Iowa, where candidates that dare speak against farm subsidies court political death. And in top tier developing countries like Brazil and India, these governments wish to protect their farmers because they comprise a big part of their economy and population.
The central dispute (very much reduced and in layman terms) is this: Developed countries and top tier developing countries all very much wish to protect their home grown agriculture. Unfortunately, these high barriers hurt the poorest countries since for poor countries, agriculture is one of the few areas where they have a comparative advantage. So, all the developed countries know they need to cut back on subsidies, the problem is, by how much?
While many in the media probably will either place blame equally or just blame the Bush administration, for once, the Bush administration deserves a bit more credit than it will get.
Bush has deviated from the free market ideology occasionally, but this time, Bush, perhaps because he no longer needs to face an election, actually took the politically daring stand and advocated deep cuts (up to 60%) and stood strongly for free market principles. But the Europeans complained that the cuts were too much and of course the farm lobbies cried bloody murder. Bush wanted big cuts over cosmetic cuts because he wanted serious change, unfortunately, the other nations choose national interests over a win-win and principled situation.
So what’s next? More bilateral and regional agreements will be spotted. For around the same time, the US and ASEAN inked an agreement for cooperation on a wide swath on issues, including trade. The only good news in a very bad case of the Mondays for free trade.