Like the most recent crisis in the Taiwan Straits and the Gulf War in 1991, the bombing assault carried out by the United States against Taliban forces in October 2001 is likely to spark agitation among the elite nations of the developing world—agitation for the expansion or creation of aircraft carrier programs that will secure a place for these nations on the global strategic map.

Surpassed in importance only by nuclear and biochemical weapons, the aircraft carrier has ruled as queen of the seas and juggernaut of conventional weaponry since it dethroned the battleship on December 7, 1941. By sinking eight US battleships stationed at Pearl Harbor, the six aircraft carriers of Japan’s Imperial Combined Fleet rudely awakened the world to a new reality in warfare and crowned the aircraft carrier as the single most coveted piece of military hardware.

The end of the Pacific War is most closely associated with the dawn of the nuclear age. Although membership in the “nuclear club” garners a nation status on the international ladder of power, aircraft carriers have proven to be a more attractive means of gaining prestige in the last quarter century. Weapons of mass destruction have become strategic deterrents; due to the principle of mutually assured destruction they are never actually used. Aircraft carriers, on the other hand, are inherently offensive weapons built as a projection of power into foreign waters. Furthermore, there is no Anti-Aircraft Carrier Treaty or any mention of aircraft carriers in subsequent disarmament treaties. Indeed, the stigma attached to the development of nuclear and biochemical weapons that has won India, Pakistan, Iraq, and North Korea reprobation rather than respect has not tainted the ownership of aircraft carriers.

Thus, when film footage is broadcast worldwide showing US planes launched from aircraft carriers pounding military targets with guided missiles, government and military leaders are tempted to reach for their wallets and climb a rung on the ladder of international clout. According to a US State Department memorandum, the price associated with building an aircraft carrier is roughly equivalent to that of developing a “deterrent capable” nuclear arsenal. Visually prominent, relatively uncontroversial, and symbolically on par with the nuclear key to US hegemony, an aircraft carrier seems an attractive investment for developing nations trying to beat their competitors to the First World.

India and China in particular have worried the Indian Ocean region with suggestions of interest in acquiring aircraft carriers. For India, this move was originally motivated by the collapse of the Cold War power balance and the US demonstration of the power of carriers during the Gulf War. India’s interest in acquiring an aircraft carrier was clear in 1999 when the Chief of Naval Staff spoke of introducing three new carriers, which would establish the Indian Navy as a “bluewater Navy, with fleets in the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and Indian Ocean, on the same lines as the US Pacific, Atlantic, and Mediterranean fleets.” While discussions with Russia over the purchase of the Gorshkov have stalled, expansion beyond its current fleet of one carrier continues to be a goal of the Indian Navy. Debate rages, however, over the utility of such an expenditure. Supporters cite the vulnerability of an exposed coastline and valuable trade routes, but as the Chief of Naval Staff suggested, an expanded aircraft carrier fleet would primarily serve as a symbol, putting India a step ahead of its rival, Pakistan, which has nuclear capabilities but no carriers.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy in China asserts that the defense of its territorial claims in the South China Sea requires at least one aircraft carrier. In reality, this goal could be achieved more easily with its battery of short range missiles. Furthermore, China’s explicitly defensive military doctrine contradicts an aircraft carrier’s overtly offensive purpose. Although the navy has been researching aircraft carriers since the early 1980s, China’s recent push to acquire one seems largely due to its humiliation at the hands of the United States during the Taiwan Straits crisis. A Chinese aircraft carrier would serve as a symbol of national pride and of sufficient retaliatory power in the bluffing game that China periodically plays with the United States over the island of Taiwan.

Of course, a symbol is all China is likely to have. Aside from the prohibitive cost of buying or building the carrier itself, each carrier requires a battle group of smaller but equally expensive ships to protect it from submarine and air attack and to support it far from home waters. In addition, one aircraft carrier would do little to increase a nation’s naval power. Each carrier needs to spend roughly half the year in the dock undergoing repairs, and to make its carrier fleet an effective tool, each nation also needs to devote one of its carriers for at least half of each year to crew training. This implies that any nation needs at least three carriers to have just one battle-ready at any given time. When the need for support craft, maintenance, and multiple carrier groups is taken into account, the cost of acquiring a meaningful aircraft carrier presence is prohibitively high and far outweighs the strategic benefit to a rising developing nation. Thailand experienced just this problem: after commissioning the Chakri Nareubet in 1997, the nation adapted the ship to perform disaster relief, troop transport, and royal transportation. It rarely performs any actions remotely associated with its original military purpose unless it is during a public display. China, meanwhile, has broken down and reportedly backed several Hong Kong businessmen in the purchase of a junked carrier from Ukraine as a tourist attraction.

Thus, while decommissioned Soviet aircraft carriers may still be glutting the international market, no serious buyers are likely to be found. No matter how much rising powers such as India and China may make noises about matching US naval might, the reality is that the status quo is unlikely to change in the short term: symbolic power gained through the acquisition of aircraft carriers, no matter how much clout it might garner, will never displace conventional weapons with more concrete military significance.