The Cold War era gave rise to an extensive body of arms control literature focusing on the process by which formal agreements could be achieved. If restraints could be imposed on military operations as a type of informal arms control in wartime, could such tacit agreements be utilized in peace-time arms control settings? As a matter of national policy, nations could and did postpone the development and deployment of specific weapons systems as an incentive for an opponent to take similar action. These measures took place outside the cumbersome negotiations leading to a treaty. Thus tacit bargaining offered nations a highly flexible means of accessing the intentions of an enemy, signaling resolve or demonstrating a willingness to accommodate. George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, in their book <I>Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control</I>, represent a logical outgrowth of earlier books in the subject. Because its rigorous assesment of tacit bargaining includes potential and inherent limitations, historical analysis, and formal modeling and simulation, this volume represents an important addition to the literature of its field.